[Home ] [Archive]   [ فارسی ]  
:: Main :: About :: Current Issue :: Archive :: Search :: Submit :: Contact ::
Main Menu
Home::
Journal Information::
Articles archive::
For Authors::
For Reviewers::
Registration::
Contact us::
Site Facilities::
::
Search in website

Advanced Search
..
Receive site information
Enter your Email in the following box to receive the site news and information.
..
:: Volume 24, Issue 97 (2-2025) ::
audit knowledge 2025, 24(97): 306-326 Back to browse issues page
The role of corporate governance mechanisms on lender supervision: Testing the borrowers' tax planning theory
Abbas Ghodratizoeram * , Vahid Oskou ,  Mohammad Norouzi
Abstract:   (104 Views)
The main objective of this study is to investigate the role of corporate governance mechanisms on lenders' supervision: testing the theory of borrowers' tax planning. The statistical population of this study is companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which number 167 companies, and the time period of this study includes a 6-year period from the beginning of 2017 to 2023. The research method is of an applied type, and the new Rahavard Novin software and the Stock Exchange Organization website were used to collect research information, and then the collected data were analyzed using the Eviews software. The results of the study showed that there is a negative and significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and borrowers' tax avoidance. Corporate governance mechanisms also limit borrowers' tax aggression.
 
Keywords: Corporate governance mechanisms, tax aggression, tax avoidance.
Full-Text [PDF 939 kb]   (46 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: Auditing
Received: 2023/08/7 | Accepted: 2024/07/31 | Published: 2025/02/28
Add your comments about this article
Your username or Email:

CAPTCHA


XML   Persian Abstract   Print


Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:

Ghodratizoeram A, Oskou V, Norouzi . The role of corporate governance mechanisms on lender supervision: Testing the borrowers' tax planning theory. audit knowledge 2025; 24 (97) :306-326
URL: http://danesh.dmk.ir/article-1-3116-en.html


Rights and permissions
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Volume 24, Issue 97 (2-2025) Back to browse issues page
دانش حسابرسی Audit  Science
Persian site map - English site map - Created in 0.14 seconds with 35 queries by YEKTAWEB 4657