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Assessing the Scope of Article 53 of the Constitution in Light of the Views of the Constituent Power and the Interpreting Body
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Ahmad Reza Dastgheib   , Mahdi Nouraei * |
| Faculty member of Shahid Beheshti University and Director of the Human Rights Department at the UNESCO Chair for Human Rights. Corresponding Author Iran.Ut.Ac.Ir@Gmail.Com |
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Abstract: (267 Views) |
Article 53 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a cornerstone of the public finance system, mandates the centralization of all government revenues in the accounts of the Central Treasury and requires that all expenditures be made within the limits of approved appropriations in accordance with the law. This principle was established with the aim of achieving transparency, financial discipline, and effective oversight of public resources and expenditures. Despite the explicit provision by the legislator, ambiguities have always persisted regarding the scope of this article, particularly concerning the entities covered and the resources that must be deposited into the treasury. This research, employing an analytical method and referring to library sources, legal documents, executive practices, and the opinions of the Guardian Council, examines the scope of Article 53. The research findings indicate that, firstly, the concept of "government" (Dolat) in this article has been interpreted broadly, encompassing not only the executive branch but also other branches of power and sovereign bodies. Secondly, state-owned companies and non-governmental public institutions, due to their sovereign and non-private nature, are not exempt from the scope of this article despite having independent legal personalities, and their revenues are also subject to centralization in the treasury. Thirdly, the scope of "law" in this article is not limited to the annual budget law but includes other financial laws containing fiscal provisions. Fourthly, regarding donations and grants, the Guardian Council's religious approach, which deems deposit into the treasury unnecessary if the donation is allocated to a specific institution, interacts with the logic and purpose of Article 53. This interaction could be harmonized by allocating one hundred percent of such funds to the same institution after deposit into the treasury, thereby ensuring both compliance with religious standards and more comprehensive oversight of these resources. This research, while providing a comprehensive analysis of the scope of Article 53, also examines the obstacles and instances of its violation within Iran's legal system |
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| Keywords: Article 53 of the Constitution, Centralization of Revenues, Central Treasury, State-Owned Companies, Non-Governmental Public Institutions |
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Full-Text [PDF 603 kb]
(441 Downloads)
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Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Auditing
Received: 2025/02/9 | Accepted: 2025/06/28 | Published: 2025/06/28
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